Montclair State University

Montclair State University Digital
Commons
Department of Justice Studies Faculty
Scholarship and Creative Works

Department of Justice Studies

Spring 4-17-2008

Development and Validation of the Counterfactual Thinking for
Negative Events Scale
Tarika Daftary Kapur
Montclair State University, daftarykaput@montclair.edu

Mark S. Rye
University of Dayton

Melissa B. Cahoon
University of Dayton

Rahan S. Ali
Pennsylvania State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/justice-studies-facpubs
Part of the Applied Behavior Analysis Commons, Behavior and Ethology Commons, Cognition and
Perception Commons, Cognitive Psychology Commons, Educational Administration and Supervision
Commons, Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Research Commons, Educational Psychology
Commons, Other Psychology Commons, and the Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

MSU Digital Commons Citation
Daftary Kapur, Tarika; Rye, Mark S.; Cahoon, Melissa B.; and Ali, Rahan S., "Development and Validation of
the Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale" (2008). Department of Justice Studies Faculty
Scholarship and Creative Works. 131.
https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/justice-studies-facpubs/131

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Justice Studies at Montclair State
University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Justice Studies Faculty
Scholarship and Creative Works by an authorized administrator of Montclair State University Digital Commons. For
more information, please contact digitalcommons@montclair.edu.

Journal of Personality Assessment

ISSN: 0022-3891 (Print) 1532-7752 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hjpa20

Development and Validation of the Counterfactual
Thinking for Negative Events Scale
Mark S. Rye , Melissa B. Cahoon , Rahan S. Ali & Tarika Daftary
To cite this article: Mark S. Rye , Melissa B. Cahoon , Rahan S. Ali & Tarika Daftary (2008)
Development and Validation of the Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale, Journal of
Personality Assessment, 90:3, 261-269, DOI: 10.1080/00223890701884996
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00223890701884996

Published online: 17 Apr 2008.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 1269

View related articles

Citing articles: 27 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=hjpa20

Journal of Personality Assessment, 90(3), 261–269, 2008
C Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
Copyright 
ISSN: 0022-3891 print / 1532-7752 online
DOI: 10.1080/00223890701884996

Development and Validation of the Counterfactual Thinking
for Negative Events Scale
MARK S. RYE,1 MELISSA B. CAHOON,1 RAHAN S. ALI,2 AND TARIKA DAFTARY3
1

Department of Psychology, University of Dayton
Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University
3
Department of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice
2

We examined the psychometric properties of the newly created Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale (CTNES) in two studies
involving university undergraduates. In Study 1 (N = 634), factor analysis revealed four subscales that correspond with various types of counterfactual thinking: Nonreferent Downward, Other-Referent Upward, Self-Referent Upward, and Nonreferent Upward. The subscales were largely
orthogonal and had adequate internal consistency and test–retest reliability. The CTNES subscales were positively correlated with a traditional
method of assessing counterfactual thinking and were related as expected to contextual aspects of the negative event, negative affect, and cognitive
style. In Study 2 (N = 208), we further examined the validity of the scale and demonstrated that the subscales were sensitive to an experimental
manipulation concerning the type of negative event participants recalled. Moreover, the CTNES subscales correlated in the expected direction with
measures of coping and cognitive style.

Counterfactual thinking involves imagining alternatives to reality and is often linguistically represented as “if only . . . ”
thoughts. Researchers have suggested that the mental generation
of alternatives to reality is a common and perhaps fundamental
cognitive process (Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1990). Counterfactual thoughts occur spontaneously as well as in response
to experimental manipulations (Sanna & Turley, 1996).
Counterfactual thoughts can vary along several dimensions
such as direction, structure, and object of reference (Roese &
Olson, 1995b). Regarding direction, counterfactuals can involve an imagined outcome that is either better (upward) or
worse (downward) than one’s actual situation. Regarding structure, counterfactual thoughts may add elements to the situation
(additive: e.g., “If only I had gone to the review session . . . ”),
remove elements (subtractive: e.g., “If only I had refused that
last drink . . . ”), or replace one element with another (substitutional: e.g., “If only I had taken the new job offer rather than
staying in my present position . . . ”). Counterfactuals can also
refer to actions taken by oneself (self-referent), someone else
(other-referent), or nobody (nonreferent).

MEASUREMENT OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING
Researchers have developed several methods of measuring
counterfactual thinking (see Miller et al., 1990, for a review).
One approach involves asking participants to list “if only”
thoughts after considering a negative event (Roese & Olson,
1993). A second approach involves explicitly prompting participants to list how things could have been better or worse
(Roese & Olson, 1995a; Sanna & Turley, 1996). A third approach involves asking participants to “think aloud” as a means
of detecting counterfactual thoughts (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993). A fourth approach involves havReceived November 15, 2006; Revised April 13, 2007.
Address correspondence to Mark S. Rye, Department of Psychology, University of Dayton, 300 College Park, Dayton, OH 45469-1430; Email: Mark.Rye@
notes.udayton.edu

ing participants read scenarios and choose which character in
the story would experience more of a particular counterfactual
emotion such as regret (Gleicher et al., 1990; Landman, 1987;
Lundberg & Frost, 1992). A fifth approach involves having participants read vignettes while responding to Likert or semanticdifferential scales that assess emotional responses (Boninger,
Gleicher, & Strathman, 1994; Macrae, 1992; Macrae & Milne,
1992; Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990; Miller & McFarland, 1986;
Turley, Sanna, & Reiter, 1995).
Although the preceding approaches are useful, they have limitations. For instance, when researchers use open-ended questions to elicit counterfactual thoughts, the process of training
raters and coding items can be labor intensive. In addition, although this method provides data on the number and type of
counterfactuals identified, it provides no information concerning the frequency of each thought. Conceivably, two individuals who identify the same number and type of counterfactual thoughts could experience different outcomes depending
on the frequency with which they experience such thoughts.
Moreover, participants who have difficulty identifying different
types of counterfactual thoughts in response to an open-ended
question might do so more easily if provided with prompts.
Indeed, the open-ended format often elicits a small number of
counterfactuals (e.g., Sanna & Turley, 1996). As noted previously, some assessment methods ask participants to generate
counterfactual thoughts in response to artificial scenarios. However, participants might better identify and access counterfactual
thoughts when responding to a personally meaningful event. Finally, some assessment methods fail to assess counterfactual
thinking directly, focusing instead on its presumed effect (e.g.,
greater regret). Given these limitations, there is a need for a
psychometrically sound measure of counterfactual thinking that
is easy to administer and score, that asks participants to reflect
on personally meaningful events, and that directly assesses a
variety of types of counterfactual thoughts. Our measure is designed to examine counterfactual thoughts in response to past
negative events and requires retrospective reflection. Thus, the
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measure would not be appropriate for assessing counterfactuals
in response to laboratory induced events requiring immediate
reflection.

Correlates of Counterfactual Thinking
To assess the validity of our measure, we examined how it
correlated with constructs that have previously been shown to
relate to counterfactual thinking. We focused on measures of
affect, cognitive style, and coping strategies.
Counterfactuals and affect. Research has consistently
shown that counterfactuals are associated with affect (Roese,
1994). For instance, negative affect often activates counterfactual thinking (Roese, 1997). Furthermore, the relationship
between affect and counterfactuals is reciprocal, as counterfactuals can trigger affective responses (Roese, 1997; Sanna,
1999). Specifically, upward counterfactuals can elicit negative
affect (Davis, Lehman, Wortman, Silver, & Thompson, 1995),
whereas downward counterfactuals can elicit positive affect
(Roese, 1994).
Counterfactuals and cognitive style. Counterfactual
thinking relates to various aspects of cognitive style such as
rumination and beliefs about oneself and/or the world. For instance, Kocovski, Endler, Rector, and Flett (2005) found that
participants high in social anxiety were more likely to ruminate
and also to list more upward counterfactual thoughts than participants low in social anxiety. As explained by Roese (1997),
“counterfactual thinking that is not shut down normally but spins
repeatedly into unhealthy ruminations may occur in some individuals, but this likely represents a breakdown in a normally
functional process of checks and balances, or activation and
inhibition” (p. 144).
Counterfactual thinking often relates to views of oneself. For
example, Roese and Olson (1993) found that high self-esteem
participants were more likely than low self-esteem participants
to generate counterfactuals following success, whereas low selfesteem participants were more likely than high self-esteem participants to generate counterfactuals following failure. Sanna,
Turley-Ames, and Meier (1999) found that participants’ moods
moderate the relationship between self-esteem and counterfactuals. Specifically, they found that both high and low self-esteem
individuals generated more downward than upward counterfactuals when in good moods. However, when in bad moods, high
self-esteem participants generated more downward counterfactuals, whereas low self-esteem participants generated more upward counterfactuals.
Counterfactual thinking also relates to one’s view of the
world. For instance, optimists (relative to defensive pessimists)
are more likely to generate downward counterfactuals in response to negative moods and challenging events (Kasimatis
& Wells, 1995; Sanna, 1996, 1998). Sanna, Chang, Carter, and
Small (2006) suggested that optimists (similar to people with
high self-esteem) may retrospectively restore positive self-views
by using self-serving attributions (Norem & Kantor, 1986) and
by thinking downward counterfactuals (Sanna, 2000). Thus, it
is possible that optimists are better than pessimists at distancing themselves from past failures. Interestingly, counterfactual
thinking has not yet been found to relate to locus of control (Eck
& Kite, 1997). However, research on how these constructs relate
is limited, and the issue merits additional consideration.
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Counterfactuals and coping. Research has examined the
role of counterfactual thinking in coping efforts (Davis et al.,
1995). Upward counterfactuals are presumed to serve a preparative function, enabling individuals to imagine how their situations could have been improved. As stated by Roese (1994),
upward counterfactuals “may be taken as schemata for future
action, making salient those scripts that are necessary to facilitate success” (p. 806). Roese (1994) demonstrated that the
generation of upward counterfactuals following unsatisfactory
outcomes can lead to improvements in future performance. Similarly, Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1979) suggested that mental simulation can help people develop a plan of action in an
integrated, efficient manner and to develop contingency plans.
Instead of influencing future performance, downward counterfactuals are presumed to regulate affect by providing a contrast
that reveals one’s actual situation to be better in comparison to
the imagined alternative.
STUDY 1
Study 1 Goal and Hypotheses
Our goal in Study 1 was to evaluate the reliability and validity
of a new Likert-type measure of counterfactual thinking (Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale; CTNES). We hypothesized that factor analysis would reveal multiple factors corresponding with different dimensions of counterfactual thinking
(e.g., upward/downward, additive/subtractive). Further, we hypothesized that the CTNES would correlate with another method
of measuring counterfactual thinking (i.e., listing counterfactuals in response to an open-ended question). We also posited
that the CTNES would relate to measures of negative affect and
cognitive style, although a priori hypotheses could not be made
until the factor structure of the new scale was examined.
Participants
We recruited participants (N = 634) from introductory psychology courses at one medium-sized Catholic university and
one large public university. The majority of participants were
female (67%) and White (86%). Other ethnic groups included
Black or African American (4%), Asian, Asian American,
or Pacific Islander (4%), Latino(a) (3%), and other (3%).
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 44 years (M = 18.99,
SD = 1.98).
We asked participants to write briefly about a recent event
that had a negative impact on them. Some of the most commonly reported negative events included death of a loved one
(18%), health problems (17%), and separation from a loved one
(14%). Using a scale ranging from 1 (not at all distressing) to 5
(extremely distressing), participants indicated that they experienced a high level of distress following the negative event (M =
3.96, SD = 1.04). Participants reported that the negative event
had occurred within the past year (78%), between 1 and 3 years
(15%), or more than 3 years ago (7%).
STUDY 1 INSTRUMENTS
Counterfactual Thinking Measures
Open-ended counterfactuals. Adapting a procedure for
identifying counterfactual thoughts from Roese and Olson
(1995b), we asked participants to write about and reflect on
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a recent negative event. Participants then had 5 min to list any
“if only” thoughts they experienced pertaining to the event.

complete the second survey administration. Students received
course credit for participation.

CTNES. Initially, we created 30 items to assess various
aspects of counterfactual thinking described in the literature
(e.g., upward–downward, self-referent, other-referent, nonreferent, additive–subtractive) as well as affective components shown
to accompany counterfactuals (i.e., sadness, relief). We asked
participants to consider the negative event they described earlier
and indicate how frequently they experienced various types of
counterfactual thoughts using Likert-type items with response
possibilities ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (very often). The initial pool of 30 items was reduced to 16 items following factor
analytic results (see Results section and Appendix).

Results
Factor analysis. We conducted a principal components
analysis with varimax rotation on the initial pool of 30 items.
We eliminated factors with eigenvalues less than 1 or with inadequate Cronbach alphas and retained items if factor loadings
were greater than .40. Additionally, we eliminated three items
that were conceptually inconsistent with remaining factor items
and six items that appeared redundant. Using these criteria, results indicated that a four-factor solution was most appropriate
(see Table 1). Each factor included four items, resulting in
a 16-item total scale. The first factor (Nonreferent Downward),
with loadings ranging from .78 to .87, assesses downward counterfactual thoughts without reference to oneself or others (e.g.,
“I think about how much worse things could have been”). The
second factor (Other-Referent Upward), with loadings ranging
from .62 to .87, assesses upward counterfactual thoughts that
reference the actions of others [e.g., “If only another person (or
other people) had not been so selfish, this whole mess could have

Supplemental items concerning negative event. We constructed several items concerning the context of the negative
event using a 5-point Likert-type scale with anchors depending
on the question. These included “To what extent do you view
[the negative event as being] within your personal control?”;
“How likely are you to face a similar situation in the future?”;
“In general, I tend to regret missed opportunities more than having taken a chance”; and “In general, I find that I have a lot of
‘if only’ thoughts after I experience negative events.”

TABLE 1.—Principal components analysis of the CTNES.
Factor

Measures of Affect and Cognitive Style
Depression. We measured depression using the Center for
Epidemiologic Studies–Depressed Mood Scale (Radloff, 1977).
Participants considered how they felt or behaved during the past
week on 20 Likert-type items with response possibilities ranging
from 1 (rarely or none of the time) to 4 (most or all of the time).
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .89.
Rumination. We administered the Dissipation-Rumination
Scale (Caprara, 1986) to assess a general tendency to ruminate
about events. Participants rated 20 statements using a Likerttype scale ranging from 1 (completely false for me) to 6 (completely true for me). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .84.
Self-esteem. We used the Texas Social Behavior Inventory
(Helmreich & Stapp, 1974) to measure self-esteem. Participants
rated 16 statements on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at
all characteristic of me) to 5 (very much characteristic of me).
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .89.
Optimism–pessimism. We used the Extended Life Orientation Test (Chang, Maydeu-Olivares, & D’Zurilla, 1997) to assess
optimism and pessimism. Participants rated 15 statements on a
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly
disagree). The Pessimism subscale consists of nine items and
the Optimism subscale consists of six items. Cronbach’s alphas
for both subscales were .77.
Procedure
We asked participants to describe a negative event and complete the open-ended measure of counterfactual thinking prior
to completion of the remaining measures. Participants completed surveys on two occasions, with approximately 2 weeks
between administrations. A total of 634 participants completed
the first survey administration, and 337 participants returned to

Item

1

2

I think about how much worse things could have
been.
I feel relieved when I think about how much
worse things could have been.
I count my blessings when I think about how
much worse things could have been.
Although what happened was negative, it clearly
could have been a lot worse.
If only another person (or other people) had not
been so selfish, this whole mess could have
been avoided.
If another person (or other people) had not been
so inconsiderate, things would have been
better.
If only other people (or another person) would
have acted differently, this situation would
have never happened.
If only another person (or other people) had
spoken up at the time, the situation would
have turned out better.
I think about how much better things would have
been if I had acted differently.
I wish I had a time machine so I could just take
back something I said or did.
If only I had listened to my friends and/or
family, things would have turned out better.
I think about how much better things could have
been if I had not failed to take action.
I feel sad when I think about how much better
things could have been.
I think about how much better things could have
been.
Although the bad situation was nobody’s fault, I
think about how things could have turned out
better.
I cannot stop thinking about how I wish things
would have turned out.

.87

.03 –.02

.86 –.05

3

4

.03

.02 –.11

.84 –.05 –.07 –.02
.78

.03

.07 –.08

–.04

.87

.02 –.02

.02

.86

.04 –.11

–.01

.81 –.04

.15

.62

.16

.22

–.02 –.01

.80

.16

–.06

.04

.74

.21

.01

.06

.73 –.01

.07

.07

.73

.11

–.12

.16

.14

.79

–.10

.20

.21

.76

–.09

.12

.28

.75

.12 –.28 –.08

.66

.00

Note. Items in bold load higher than .40 on the respective factor. CTNES = Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale.
N = 631.
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been avoided”]. The third factor (Self-Referent Upward), with
loadings ranging from .73 to .80, assesses upward counterfactuals that reference one’s own actions (e.g., “I wish I had a time
machine so I could just take back something I said or did”). The
fourth factor (Nonreferent Upward), with loadings ranging from
.66 to .79, assesses upward counterfactual thoughts without reference to oneself or others (e.g., “Although the bad situation
was nobody’s fault, I think about how things could have turned
out better”). The four factors, which collectively accounted for
65% of the variance, had eigenvalues ranging from 2.38 to 2.86
(see Table 2). Cronbach alphas across subscales ranged from .75
to .86, and 2-week test–retest reliability ranged from .73 to .84.
The factors appear to be orthogonal, as none of the items loaded
highly onto more than one factor, and the factor intercorrelations
ranged from .02 to .32.

Correlations with open-ended counterfactual measure.
We trained two raters to identify and classify types of openended counterfactual thoughts that corresponded with the
CTNES subscales. Raters were blind to the CTNES scores.
Of the protocols, 20% were examined by both raters, yielding
interrater reliability estimates from r = .70 to .93, all ps < .001.
For all of the analyses in this study, we set the alpha level at
.01 to adjust for the sample size and for multiple comparisons.
Number of self-referent upward counterfactuals from the openended question was positively correlated with the Self-Referent
Upward subscale (r = .37, p < .001) and was unrelated to the
other subscales. Number of other-referent upward counterfactuals was positively correlated with the Other-Referent Upward
(r = .19, p < .001) and Nonreferent Upward subscales (r =
.15, p < .001), and negatively correlated with the Self-Referent
Upward subscale (r = –.23, p < .001). Number of nonreferent downward counterfactuals was positively correlated with
the Nonreferent Downward subscale (r = .13, p < .01). Number of nonreferent upward counterfactuals was unrelated to the
CTNES subscales.

Correlations with affect and cognitive style measures.
We computed correlations to examine the relationships between
the CTNES subscales and the measures of depression, selfesteem, rumination, optimism, and pessimism (see Table 3).
Self-Referent Upward correlated positively with depression, rumination, and pessimism, and negatively with self-esteem and
optimism. Nonreferent Upward correlated positively with depression, rumination, and pessimism and negatively with selfTABLE 2.—CTNES subscale statistics.

Factor

1
2
3
4

Subscale

Nonreferent
Downward
Other-Referent
Upward
Self-Referent
Upward
Nonreferent
Upward

%
Eigenvalue Variance

M
(SD)

Test–
Alpha Retest

2.86

17.85

10.57 (4.24)

.86

.73∗

2.72

16.97

10.64 (4.75)

.82

.84∗

2.44

15.24

9.98 (4.10)

.76

.79∗

2.38

14.89

12.65 (4.00)

.75

.74∗

Note. N = 631. CTNES = Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale. Test–
retest correlations were based on a subset of participants for which retest data were available:
n = 337.
∗
p < .001.

TABLE 3.—Correlations between CTNES and affect/cognitive style measures.

Depression
Self-Esteem
Rumination
Optimism
Pessimism

Nonreferent
Downward

Other-Referent
Upward

Self-Referent
Upward

Nonreferent
Upward

−.04
.06
−.07
.03
−.04

.09
−.03
.13∗
−.06
.06

.31∗∗
−.16∗∗
.19∗∗
−.20∗∗
.23∗∗

.33∗∗
−.11∗
.11∗
−.09
.19∗∗

Note. CTNES = Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale.
∗
p < .01. ∗∗ p < .001.

esteem. Other-Referent Upward correlated positively with rumination. Nonreferent Downward was unrelated to depression
or the cognitive style variables.

Correlations with negative event context items. Several
negative event context items were correlated with the CTNES
subscales. For instance, participants rated the extent to which
the negative event was in their personal control. As expected,
the only subscale this item related to was Self-Referent Upward (r = .48, p < .001). In addition, only Self-Referent Upward was related to an item assessing a tendency to regret
missed opportunities (r = .13, p < .01). An item measuring perceived likelihood that the negative event would occur again was
only related to the Other-Referent Upward subscale (r = –.22,
p < .001). An item concerning the general tendency to have “if
only” thoughts after negative events was correlated with SelfReferent Upward (r = .31, p < .001) and Nonreferent Upward
(r = .32, p < .001).
STUDY 2
Study 2 Goal and Hypotheses
The goal of Study 2 was to further examine the validity of the
CTNES. In particular, we wanted to determine if the scale was
sensitive to an experimental manipulation concerning the type
of negative event participants recalled. We hypothesized that
participants directed to recall a negative event in which their
own actions significantly contributed to the negative outcome
(self-caused condition) would score higher on Self-Referent
Upward than the other participants. Similarly, we hypothesized
that participants directed to recall a negative event in which
the actions of another person (or other persons) significantly
contributed to the negative outcome (other-caused condition)
would score higher on Other-Referent Upward than the other
participants. Finally, we hypothesized that participants directed
to recall a negative event that was nobody’s fault (fate condition) would score higher on Nonreferent Upward than the other
participants.
We also wanted to examine how the CTNES subscales related to coping strategies and additional measures of cognitive
style. We hypothesized that Self-Referent Upward would be
positively related to a measure of negative views of self and
that Other-Referent Upward would be positively related to a
measure of negative views of the world. Despite past research
that has shown no relationship between counterfactual thinking
and locus of control (e.g., Eck & and Kite, 1997), the referential dimension of the CTNES along with our experimental
manipulation suggested the utility in revisiting this question.
Specifically, we were curious if locus of control would show
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any differential relationships between the Self-Referent, OtherReferent, and Nonreferent subscales. Given the exploratory nature of this question, we hypothesized no specific directional
relationships among these constructs. With respect to coping
strategies, we hypothesized that all of the CTNES subscales
would be positively related to logical analysis. Moreover, we
hypothesized that Nonreferent Downward would be positively
correlated with positive reappraisal.

Participants
We recruited participants (N = 208) from introductory psychology courses at a medium-sized Midwestern university. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 38 years (M = 19.2, SD =
1.8). The majority of participants were female (57%) and White
(95%). Other ethnic groups represented in the sample included
Black or African American (2%), Latino(a) (.5%), and other
(2.5%).
STUDY 2 INSTRUMENTS
Counterfactual Thinking
We used the 16-item (CTNES; see Appendix) to assess counterfactual thinking.
Measures of Cognitive Style
Cognitive Triad Inventory. We used two subscales of the
Cognitive Triad Inventory (CTI; Beckham, Leber, Watkins,
Boyer, & Cook, 1986) in this study. For both subscales, participants respond to items constructed on a 10-item Likert-type
scale with response possibilities ranging from 1 (totally agree)
to 7 (totally disagree). CTI–Self measures the degree to which
individuals have negative views of themselves, whereas CTI–
World measures the degree to which individuals have negative
views of the world. Cronbach’s alphas for the CTI–Self and
CTI–World subscales were .81 and .76, respectively.
Locus of control. Locus of control was assessed using the
Internal–External Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966). Participants considered 23 pairs of statements and indicated which
statement they believe to be more true. Kuder–Richardson 20
for this scale was .64.
Measures of Coping Strategies
Coping Responses Inventory (CRI). The CRI (Moos,
1993) is a multidimensional assessment of how individuals cope
with stressful events. Participants considered the negative event
they recalled earlier and indicated the frequency with which
they employed various coping strategies. Each subscale has six
items featuring a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not
at all) to 4 (fairly often). This study included two of the cognitive subscales,1 which assess adaptive strategies to think about
the negative event. They consisted of Logical Analysis (e.g.,
“Think of new ways to deal with the problem”) and Positive
Reappraisal (e.g., “Try to see the good side of the situation”).
Raw scores were converted into T scores following the procedure outlined in the manual (Moos, 1993). Cronbach’s alphas
for the subscales ranged from .67 to .72.
1 Two

other cognitive subscales, Cognitive Avoidance and Acceptance/Resignation, were excluded from analyses due to poor internal consistency
(α = .63 and .56, respectively).
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Procedure
We recruited participants from introductory psychology
courses and gave them class credit for participation. As in Study
1, we instructed participants to recall a negative event that they
had recently experienced. In Study 2, we randomly assigned participants to one of three event-type conditions. Participants in
the self-caused condition considered a negative event in which
their own actions significantly contributed to the outcome. Participants in the other-caused condition considered a negative
event in which another person’s (or other persons’) actions significantly contributed to the outcome. Finally, participants in
the fate condition considered a negative event that appeared to
be nobody’s fault. The most common types of negative events
listed by participants across conditions included loss of a relationship (31%), argument/fighting (18%), and alcohol-related
problem (15%).
Results
Event controllability manipulation. For all analyses, we
set the alpha level at .01 to adjust for sample size and multiple
comparisons. Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) revealed no differences across condition with respect to recency of the negative
event, F (2, 192) = 2.20, p > .05, or level of distress participants
experienced about the negative event, F (2, 180) = 1.47, p >
.05. To assess the validity of our manipulation, a rater blind to
condition and study hypotheses classified participants’ negative
events as primarily self-caused, other caused, or due to fate.
The rater almost always correctly identified responses from the
self-caused (94%) and other-caused (89%) conditions. The rater
was somewhat less accurate identifying responses from the fate
condition (72%).
We computed ANOVAs with the CTNES subscales as the dependent variable and condition (self-caused, other caused, fate)
as the independent variable (see Table 4). Significant differences in the expected direction were found across condition
on the Other-Referent Upward subscale, F (2, 205) = 15.17,
p < .001 (reffect = .35). Post hoc analyses revealed that participants in the other-caused condition scored significantly higher
than participants in the self-caused condition and the fate condition. Significant differences in the expected direction were also
found across condition on the Self-Referent Upward subscale,
F (2, 204) = 16.80, p < .001 (reffect = .33). Post hoc analyses
revealed that participants in the self-caused condition scored
TABLE 4.—Comparisons of CTNES subscale scores across condition (self, other,
fate).
Self
Subscale

Nonreferent
Downward
Other-Referent
Upward
Self-Referent
Upward
Nonreferent
Upward

Other

Fate

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

10.78

4.23

11.55

4.18

11.35

4.19

0.60

9.51

3.82

12.29

3.80

8.74

4.36

15.17∗

11.86

3.76

9.99

3.65

8.25

3.57

16.80∗

11.65

3.38

11.81

3.91

11.15

4.11

0.58

Note. CTNES = Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale.
∗
p < .001.
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TABLE 5.—Correlations between CTNES subscales and measures of cognitive
style/coping.

Scale

Nonreferent
Downward
Other-Referent
Upward
Self-Referent
Upward
Nonreferent
Upward

CTI–
Self

CTI–
World

External
Locus
of Control

CRI
Logical
Analysis

CRI
Positive
Reappraisal

.21

.45∗∗

−.05

−.16

−.11

.10

.10

.11

.29∗∗

.00

.25∗∗

.13

.06

.40∗∗

.27∗∗

.26∗∗

.23∗

.08

.40∗∗

.23∗

Note. A subset of participants (n = 143) completed the coping measures. CTNES =
Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale; CTI = Cognitive Triad Inventory; CRI
= Coping Responses Inventory.
∗
p < .01. ∗∗ p < .001.

significantly higher than participants in the other-caused condition and the fate condition. No significant differences emerged
across condition with respect to Nonreferent Downward or Nonreferent Upward subscales.

Correlations with cognitive style measures. We computed
Pearson correlations to examine the relationship between the
CTNES subscales and cognitive style. As shown in Table 5, the
CTI–Self subscale (i.e., higher scores = more negative cognitions about oneself) correlated positively with Self-Referent Upward and Nonreferent Upward. The CTI–World subscale (i.e.,
higher scores = more negative cognitions about the world) correlated positively with Nonreferent Upward. Locus of control
was unrelated to any of the subscales.
Correlations with coping strategies. Pearson correlations
were computed to examine the relationship between the CTNES
subscales and the subscales of the CRI. As shown in Table 5, the
Logical Analysis subscale correlated positively with all of the
upward CTNES subscales. The Positive Reappraisal subscale
related most strongly to Nonreferent Downward but was also
related to Self-Referent Upward and Nonreferent Upward.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Both Study 1 and Study 2 provide evidence that the newly
created CTNES has adequate psychometric properties. The factors were largely orthogonal and appear to assess different aspects of counterfactual thinking. The subscales had adequate
internal consistency and test–retest reliability. Importantly, the
CTNES was significantly related to the number of counterfactuals participants generated in response to a commonly used
open-ended assessment format. The small magnitude of these
correlations most likely reflects the restricted range of the number of counterfactuals generated by participants and the fact
that the two assessment methods explore somewhat different
aspects of counterfactual thinking (number vs. frequency). The
CTNES subscales were also related to contextual aspects of the
negative event as expected (e.g., the more likely the negative
event was perceived within one’s personal control, the higher
participants scored on Self-Referent Upward). The CTNES was
also sensitive to an experimental manipulation concerning type
of negative event. Specifically, participants who recalled a negative event that was largely caused by themselves scored signif-

icantly higher on Self-Referent Upward, whereas participants
who recalled a negative event that was largely caused by another person (or other persons) scored significantly higher on
Other-Referent Upward. No differences were found across subscales for participants assigned to the fate condition. However,
an objective rater had a harder time identifying responses from
the fate condition than the others, suggesting that participants
had a wide range of interpretations for what type of negative
event was “nobody’s fault.”

Salient Dimensions of the CTNES
The factor analysis yielded an interesting factor structure.
Contrary to hypotheses, counterfactual structure (i.e., additive/subtractive/substitutional), was not reflected in the factor
analysis. Although Roese and Olson (1993) noted ample evidence for the functional bases for certain dimensions of structure, these dimensions may not be as salient when considering
negative events. For instance, Roese and Olson (1993) found
that subtractive counterfactuals are not commonly utilized following failure or distressing events.
Object of reference and upward counterfactuals. One
salient dimension that emerged from our factor analysis involved
object of reference. It appears that attribution of responsibility
is a theme around which counterfactual thoughts cluster. Although other researchers have noted that counterfactuals that
reference oneself have different correlates than counterfactuals that reference other people (e.g., Roese & Olson, 1993),
this dimension has not received as much attention in the literature as the dimensions of direction and structure. However,
in our study, self-referent and other-referent upward counterfactuals had important implications for affect and cognitive
style.
With regard to mood, the Self-Referent and Nonreferent Upward subscales were positively related to depression. This is
consistent with the revised learned helplessness theory, which
suggests that depressed individuals are more likely to make negative attributions that are global, internal, and stable (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). The Self-Referent subscale
clearly reflects internality. The Nonreferent Upward subscale
may also reflect global thinking as evidenced by its positive association with negative views of the world. Moreover, there is
a ruminative, depressogenic theme to the Nonreferent Upward
subscale (e.g., “I feel sad when . . . ” “I cannot stop thinking
about . . . ”). Both subscales were also related to rumination,
self-esteem, and pessimism. It is possible that Self-Referent and
Nonreferent Upward counterfactuals stimulate these cognitive
processes (i.e., rumination, pessimism, and low self-esteem),
which in turn increase feelings of depression.
Interestingly, Other-Referent Upward was unrelated to depression. Other-Referent counterfactual thinking might mitigate self-reproach and depressed mood by attributing blame (or
other negative characteristics) to a clearly specified other. Moreover, Other-Referent Upward was the only upward subscale that
was not related to self-esteem, pessimism, CTI–Self, or Positive
Reappraisal subscales. These findings highlight the importance
of examining referents when studying how constructs relate to
counterfactual thinking.
Direction of counterfactuals. Consistent with hypotheses,
another dimension that differentiated factors was counterfactual
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direction (i.e., upward/downward). Interestingly, Nonreferent
Downward was unrelated to depression. This is somewhat surprising given that downward counterfactuals are presumed to
play an important role in affect regulation (Markman et al., 1993;
Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese & Olson, 1995a, 1995b; White
& Lehman, 2005). Perhaps severity of negative events plays a
role in determining whether downward counterfactuals improve
mood. Conceivably, some negative events could be so distressing that thinking about how things could have been worse does
little to improve mood. Similarly, Nonreferent Downward was
generally unrelated to the cognitive style and coping measures,
with the exception of Positive Reappraisal. Perhaps downward
counterfactuals with different referents (e.g., self or other) relate
to these constructs, but future research is needed to explore this
possibility.
With regard to stress and coping, all upward CTNES subscales
were positively related to the Logical Analysis subscale, which
assesses “cognitive attempts to understand and prepare mentally
for a stressor ...” (Moos, 1993, p. 15). This finding corresponds
with the idea that upward counterfactuals serve a preparatory
function (Roese, 1994).
Consistent with past research, there was no relationship
among any CTNES subscales and locus of control, despite
our manipulation and the distinct referential subscales in the
CTNES. The findings from both our study and Eck and Kite
(1997) appear to confirm that a general perception of controllability over events offers little predictive ability for specific
counterfactual thoughts (or frequency of such thoughts).

Limitations and Future Directions
Although the CTNES offers a promising option for assessing counterfactual thinking, it has some constraints. In these
studies, we used college student samples, and it is unclear how
well the results will generalize to other populations. Given that
clinical samples were not used, speculations about the role of
counterfactual thinking in depression and rumination remain
tentative. We wonder how CTNES scores might differ between
a control group and individuals who meet the clinical criteria
for a depressive disorder or for obsessive–compulsive disorder. A variety of other clinical measures (e.g., worry, obsessive
rumination) and trait measures (e.g., self-efficacy, perfectionism) might reveal interesting relationships with the CTNES. We
look forward to future research that explores such questions and
that further examines the validity of the CTNES using diverse
populations.
The CTNES is not designed for counterfactual research about
positive or neutral events. However, research suggests that counterfactuals are generated more frequently in response to negative events than positive or neutral events (Gleicher et al., 1990).
According to Gavanski and Wells (1989), “negative outcomes
naturally trigger counterfactual thinking because people are motivated to understand how to avoid such outcomes for themselves
in the future” (p. 323). Because the CTNES asks participants
to reflect on a personally experienced negative event, responses
will vary more than when using assessment approaches involving a common stimulus such as a vignette. However, the CTNES
could be easily adapted to a common stimulus. For example, participants could be directed to complete the scale based on a recent relationship break-up, a failure experience at work/school,
or some other specific event of interest to researchers.
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Another constraint is that the CTNES is based on one event the
participant chooses. We found a moderate positive correlation
between two of the CTNES subscales (i.e., Self-Referent Upward, Nonreferent Downward) and a single item index of one’s
general tendency to counterfactualize. However, future research
could supplement the CTNES by developing a multiple-item
trait measure of counterfactual thinking in which the focus is
one’s propensity for counterfactualizing about everyday experiences.2
Additionally, some of the subscale items are quite similar to
each other. In retrospect, we wish we had created a greater variety of items pertaining to object of reference. However, we did
not anticipate that object of reference would be a salient factor,
and removal of the similar items would have compromised subscale reliability. Nevertheless, we believe these subscales make
a unique contribution to counterfactual thinking assessment.
Finally, the CTNES identifies some dimensions of counterfactual thinking but not all of them. For instance, the CTNES does
not measure self-referent or other-referent downward counterfactuals. Researchers interested in the specific antecedents and
consequences of participants’ counterfactuals will still want to
use the thought-listing method. The CTNES does not directly
assess the intensity of counterfactual thoughts, which is an important dimension to consider (Sanna & Turley-Ames, 2000). Intensity offers information about one’s overall adjustment. Cognitive therapists, for instance, consider intensity or the degree
of belief in a particular thought (e.g., “How strongly do you
believe this to be true?”) as one index of maladaptive thinking
(Beck, 1995). As noted earlier, the CTNES is designed for retrospective reflection on a past negative event and is therefore not
appropriate for studies requiring immediate reflection following
a laboratory induced event.
These considerations underscore the importance of developing multiple forms of assessment in counterfactual thinking
research. The CTNES is intended not as a substitute but as a complement to existing assessment strategies. We hope that expanding the existing repertoire of methods will further illuminate the
role of this basic cognitive process in human functioning.
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APPENDIX

Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale (CTNES) Instructions
Please think of an event that occurred somewhat recently that had a negative impact on you. Take a few moments to vividly recall
that experience and what it was like for you.
Now, think about the types of thoughts you experienced following that undesirable event. Using the following scale, rate the
frequency with which you experienced the thoughts described below.

Scale
1 = Never; 2 = Rarely; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Often; 5 = Very Often
Items
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

I think about how much worse things could have been.
If only another person (or other people) had not been so selfish, this whole mess could have been avoided.
I think about how much better things would have been if I had acted differently.
I feel sad when I think about how much better things could have been.
I feel relieved when I think about how much worse things could have been.
If another person (or other people) had not been so inconsiderate, things would have been better.
I wish I had a time machine so I could just take back something I said or did.
I think about how much better things could have been.
I count my blessings when I think about how much worse things could have been.
If only another person (or other people) would have acted differently, this situation would have never happened.
If only I had listened to my friends and/or family, things would have turned out better.
I cannot stop thinking about how I wish things would have turned out.
Although what happened was negative, it clearly could have been a lot worse.
If only another person (or other people) had spoken up at the time, the situation would have turned out better.
I think about how much better things could have been if I had not failed to take action.
Although the bad situation was nobody’s fault, I think about how things could have turned out better.

Scoring
Nonreferent Downward: 1, 5, 9, 13; Other-Referent Upward: 2, 6, 10, 14; Self-Referent Upward: 3, 7, 11, 15; Nonreferent Upward: 4, 8, 12, 16.

